agreements, it might infringe the employer's (negative) freedom of association. Thus, the directive did not require more than the "static" incorporation approach already adopted in Germany. 7 As we have argued elsewhere, 8 the question posed by the UK Supreme Court (UKSC) to the European Court of Justice would have been a candidate for a very simple answer. In this case, what was at stake was a national rule, which went beyond the directive's requirements in providing more protection to employees. The Acquired Rights Directive is a minimum harmonization directive; its article 8 expressly allows more stringent rules in the interest of the employees; finally, as noted by the UKSC, freedom of association was not an issue in the UK context. How did we, then, get to Alemo--Herron's conclusions?
The Court's reasoning consists of three steps--although one of them, perhaps the most important, has remained concealed: 1) reinterpreting the Directive's telos, in order to overcome the "employee interest"
clause;
2) down--playing the relevance of the Directive's minimum harmonisation approach by reference to the Charter;
3) introducing a normative standard -- the freedom to conduct a business and, with it, freedom of contract.
In the coming paragraphs, we will unfold the Court's reasoning --something which the decision itself quite evidently fails to do --and its implications for the future of minimum harmonisation. By the end of the chapter, it will hopefully be clear why this institutional question should be of great interest --and a source of concern --to contract lawyers. In other words, the Directive's drafters started from the observation that certain changes in business relationships were threatening to unsettle the equilibria reached in the Member States with reference to workers protection. As a counterbalancing act, the Directive provided for a minimum degree of protection for the employees affected by the said changes. The original choice for minimum harmonisation was further reinforced by a reference to the Rome Treaty: the Directive aimed to harmonise MS legislation "while maintaining the improvement" in working conditions promised by then--article 117 EC Treaty.
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Thus, the Directive's recitals contain a strong non--regression clause. 
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With one sentence, Alemo--Herron shifts the focus on a very different spot: the balance should no longer be struck on a structural level, where the legislation tries to offset certain socio--economic changes, but within the Directive itself. The concern for such an internal balance had already been advanced in Werhof. In that decision, however, the claim was that the interests of the transferee "should not be disregarded"; 12 in Alemo--Herron those interests acquire a precise content which must be protected. The Court spends considerably more words on explaining how this should happen than it did on justifying its "fair balance" approach: the transferee "must be in a position to make the adjustments and changes necessary to carry on its operations"; in particular, "since the transfer is of an undertaking from the public sector to the private sector, the continuation of the transferee's operations will require significant adjustments and changes, given the inevitable differences in working conditions that exist between those two sectors". 13
The fair balance argument does not exhaust the decision's justification, but contributes to concealing the relevance of the minimum harmonisation clause. This sets the right background for the next step--the "hidden" argument--in which the Court nonchalantly downgrades member states prerogatives through a rather swift use of fundamental rights.
Trampling Over Minimum Harmonisation
Stimulated by the discussion in Werhof and by the Advocate General's opinion, the Court then proceeds to interpret the Directive in light of EU fundamental rights. Although the decision reads as if this were an entirely plain move, it is not. In effect, the Court tests the law of a member state, providing more protection to workers as allowed by the context of minimum harmonisation, against the European Charter of Fundamental Rights.
Article 51(1) of the ECFR sets certain limits to the Charter's effects:
The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions and bodies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law.
As former ECJ judge Rosas has convincingly argued, unlike fundamental freedoms, the Charter is only applicable to "national" cases when at least one other provision of European law is directly applicable. 14 Perhaps counterintuitively, this might not have been the case in Alemo--Herron.
A crucial question, which the Court didn't address, is indeed whether member states making use of the Minimum Harmonisation clause are implementing EU law--differently put, are national "stricter rules" ultimately national or European law? Only in the latter case would the scrutiny of UK legislation through interpreting the directive "in light" of the Charter be legitimate. The question is not entirely new, but has not found a clear answer yet, 15 with doctrine and case--law finding it equally difficult to settle.
In the literature, an image used by Stephen Weatherhill 16 seems to have become the mainstream view, 17 suggesting that the more protective rules adopted under a minimum harmonisation clause are only subject to scrutiny for compliance with the Treaty Freedoms. In his words, the community legislation sets a floor, the Treaty a ceiling and the Member 14 A. Rosas, 'When is the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Applicable at National Level?', Jurisprudence 2012, p. 1169, available online (https://www.mruni.eu/upload/iblock/c5c/002_rosas.pdf, last accessed 18 September 2015).
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Even if we consider the apparent lack of consideration in Alemo--Herron as a signal that the Court considers the matter as settled, normative questions as to the appropriateness of the solution remain pending. States are free to pursue an independent domestic policy within these boundaries (emphasis added)." 18 As shown in figure  1 , a potential violation of the fundamental freedoms brings a seemingly internal question automatically into the scope of EU law. EU Fundamental Rights, on the other hand, are not designed to have such effect.
19
In this respect, it is interesting to mention that, while the treaty and its four freedoms are originally "European", fundamental rights have an anchoring in national constitutions; excluding the application of European fundamental rights, thus, merely leaves the national courts to apply their own fundamental rights framework. 20 If an asserted violation of EU fundamental rights does not in itself grant scrutiny by the ECJ, it is the question of the scope of EU law that remains determinant.
The ECJ case--law is ambiguous. On the one hand, in one of the few cases in which it has addressed the issue squarely, 21 the Court was reluctant to apply the principle of proportionality 22 to the more protective measures of the member state going beyond the EU minimum, suggesting that this domain falls outside of the scope of EU law. De Cecco, for instance, has tried to argue in favour of a fundamental right scrutiny of the more stringent rules, concluding that there was no room maintain a judicial review "directly linked" to the respect of (general principles of Community law and, among those) EU fundamental rights. See other hand, in Karner, 24 the Court appears to expouse the contrary view. In particular, in response to the argument of one of the parties, the ECJ discussed the compatibility of the national measure going beyond the EU minimum rules with fundamental rights after finding that the measure did not violate the Fundamental Freedoms, which suggests that such measure falls within the scope of EU law in the sense of Art 51 of the Charter. While only ancillary to the main argument, and applying a very undemanding level of scrutiny, this step of the Court has raised the question whether the Court has abandoned its previous case--law, which was considered to see such measures as falling outside the scope of EU law. 25 The fact that in Werhof the Court had also relied on an argument derived from EU fundamental rights 26 , on the other hand, is less telling: in that case the review concerned the directive's "minimum" rule, not the more protective national measures.
While the Court entirely ignored the question, Advocate General Cruz Villalón takes a clear, albeit apodictic, stance, noting that "as we know, even where European Union law expressly gives Member States freedom of action, this must be exercised in accordance with that law. This obligation naturally includes, inter alia, fundamental rights, as expressly provided in Article 51 of the Charter."
27
Calling nature to witness, however, does little to explain why member states actions in this area should fall within the domain of EU law.
Several criteria have been articulated by the Court in order to identify a direct relation between member states action and European law, and none seems to tailor to our case. In the context of measures going beyond the requirements of minimum harmonisation, the member states do not seem to act as agents of the EU in the sense of the Wachauf 28 line of case--law: EU law does not require them to act at all, nor to act in a specific way. If member states decide to take action, they can do so in the manner that they deem suitable, provided that it does not infringe on the EU minimum level of protection or violate the treaty, i.e. free movement provisions. The action of the member states also does not 'derogate' from EU law, as would be required by the ERT line of cases. Even taking into account the Court's recent pronouncement in Fransson, 29 considering the "scope" 30 of EU law to cover Member States actions that somehow further the Union's goals, the fact that minimum Acting within the scope of EU law was already a connecting factor. What this scope is supposed to encompass, however, a question which can probably not be answered once for all. See C. Barnard, EU Employment Law (Oxford University Press 2012), p. 31.
harmonisation is precisely intended to let member states further their own goals seems to make a relevant difference.
All in all, neither the AG nor the Court seem to provide sufficient arguments underpinning their conclusions on a matter of great relevance to the relationship between EU law and member states policy. 31 The judgment either assumes that a (purported) violation of EU fundamental rights has the ability to bring a national situation within the scope of EU law, or that "more protective rules" are already within that scope by virtue of some undisclosed parameter. While both assumptions might be problematic, not knowing which of the two is embraced does not help. This confusion would be less striking if it didn't entail a further expansion of the ECJ's competence at the expense of a domain, that of minimum harmonisation, which has already been considerably re--dimensioned through different instruments.
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The final step to be addressed is the choice of a normative standard within the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The following paragraph will show how both the particular provision embraced by the Court and the way it was handled in Alemo--Herron represent a considerable source of concern. Especially, we will conclude, when minimum harmonisation is at stake.
Article 16 th of the Charter: The Unbearable Lightness of Essence
The ambiguous potential of EU fundamental rights review in the field of minimum harmonisation becomes more evident when one considers the standard concretely adopted by the ECJ: article 16 and the right to conduct a business, in particular in its expression represented by freedom of contract.
In the second part of its decision, the Court concludes that the Directive, interpreted in light of article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental rights, precludes national legislation allowing dynamic incorporation clauses to be transferred along with employment contracts.
Until Alemo--Herron, article 16 could be considered as encompassing a "weak" right. A similar conclusion seemed warranted in light of both its formulation ("The freedom to conduct a business in accordance with Community law and national laws and practices is recognised") and of the fact that, looking at the explanations accompanying the Charter, it 31 Notice that, if taken seriously, the non--applicability of EU law to member states' more protective measures in the context of minimum harmonisation also undermines the first part of the court's argument. In this respect, the references to Werhof created the impression that the questions asked in both cases where the same--but while interpreting the Directive's purpose is necessary to determine whether it requires something, the matter changes when the question is whether something is allowed--in particular, thanks to the minimum harmonisation clause.
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As in the case of product liability, see Bartl, Legitimacy and Eurppean Private Law, and ibi for further references. A further challenge on member states actions going beyond the minima set by European legislation seems to be implied by the Commission's recently issued Better Regulation Guidelines, so weary of member states unnecessarily "gold--plating" European measures. See http://ec.europa.eu/smart--regulation/better_regulation/documents/com_2015_215_en.pdf, p 8ò last accessed 16 September 2015.
